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This paper analyzes open innovation projects and their e⁄ects on incentives for innova-
tion. We model basic features of the General Public License (GPL), one of the most popular
open source licenses and study how ￿rms behave under this license. Under the GPL, there
is a trade-o⁄ between stimulating innovation and promoting disclosure. By using the open
source, a ￿rm can increase its technology level and therefore its probability of innovation
success and of achieving a greater pro￿t in that period. However, any innovative ￿ndings
using open source would be also open source in subsequent periods. This obligation decreases
the expected future revenue of the ￿rm. We analyze this trade-o⁄ and show that if a ￿rm
has the same technology level as the open source, it does not use the source. On the other
hand, if a ￿rm has a lower level of production technology than the open source, it is optimal
to use the source.
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11 Introduction
Open software development involves a major deviation from the private investment model of
innovation; open source innovators freely share the proprietary software that they have developed
at their private expense. For example, Linux, a computer operating system, is evolving with
many independent developers revealing the code to develop and re￿ne it. Its source code is open
in the sense that anyone has free access to it. The success of open source software raises many
questions about innovation policies with non-traditional property rights.
In this paper, we study a major feature of open innovation and its e⁄ects on incentives
for innovation. Although the source code of open source software is freely available, open
source programs are distributed under very precise licensing agreements. The GNU General
Public License (GPL) is one of the most common licenses and we model its key characteristic;
speci￿cally while every user has the freedom to use and modify programs subject to the GPL,
such modi￿cations must be distributed under the terms of the license itself if they are to be
distributed at all.
The GPL, however, does not preclude the commercial exploitation of the software, at any
stage. That is, the program users have to maintain the free access to the source, but they do
not need to share any pro￿t they make. There are around two hundred Linux open source
platform vendors globally and they pool together hundreds of applications, placed on top of
an open source operating system, marketed through a number of channels and via a number
of di⁄erent business models. It is evident that there is strong competition in this ￿eld. Once
open source code is improved by a ￿rm, by its nature, it is accessible to its customers or even
to its competitors. However, due to its complexity of programming, the inventor can enjoy
advantageous position as the ￿rst mover for a span of time. We use a two-period three-stage
model where, in each period, ￿rms decide whether to use the open source in the ￿rst stage,
pursue cost-reducing research in the second stage, and engage in Cournot competition in the
third stage.
There are several papers which have dealt with economics of open innovation. For example,
Lerner and Tirole (2002) provide a broad discussion of a number of issues, emphasizing career
concern. Johnson (2002) and Modica and Aghion (2006) present welfare results and comparative
2statics using a model of private provision of a public good. Since they use a static model, however,
they do not fully capture the main characteristic of the GPL, which is basically ￿get it for free
now, pay back when/if you succeed.￿Unlike other papers that use a private provision of a public
good type of model, we believe, our model captures the essence of the GPL in a more direct
way.
By altering the timing of incentives, open innovation under the GPL has a trade-o⁄ between
stimulating innovation and promoting disclosure. By using open knowledge, a ￿rm can increase
(decrease) its production technology level (unit cost) and therefore its probability of innovation
success and of achieving higher pro￿ts in that period. Under the GPL, however, any innovative
￿ndings that have used open knowledge should also be open knowledge in subsequent periods.
This obligation decreases the expected future revenue of the ￿rm. We investigate how such a
trade-o⁄ in￿ uences ￿rms￿open source use decision depending on their technology level relative
to the open source technology level. If a ￿rm has the same technology level as the open source,
it does not have an incentive to use the source. This is true because there is no direct gain
from using the source, while there is a potential loss due to the obligation of sharing potential
innovation with other ￿rms in the future. On the other hand, if a ￿rm has a lower level of
production technology than the open source, it is optimal to use the source. Using the source
brings a direct bene￿t because of the immediate increase in the production technology level.
However, using the source also incurs a potential loss in the sense that its innovation success
will help its rivals in the second period by the nature of the GPL. We will analyze this trade-o⁄
and show that such a potential second period loss is smaller than the loss incurred in the second
period from not using the open source in the ￿rst period. Hence such a ￿rm will always choose to
use the open source. One implication of these, open innovation is developed by lower technology
level ￿rms.
We think that it is important to characterize the behavior of a ￿rm when there is open source
subject to GPL. This enables us to discuss the welfare aspects of open innovation and compare
it to other types of licensing and patent races. This, in turn, will explain why some industries
engage in GPL, instead of other types of policies regarding innovation.
Section 2 depicts the model. Section 3 and 4 solves the model backwards. The main results
3are given in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss some relevant points and extensions. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
There are N ￿rms interacting over two periods. Each ￿rm i produces a good at a ￿rm speci￿c
unit cost ci, which is stochastically determined by investment in cost-reducing innovation. There
is also a public production technology, called open source, which can produce the good at unit
cost cos. In each period, there are three stages: (1) each ￿rm decides whether to adopt the open
source or not, (2) each ￿rm invests in cost-reducing innovation, and ￿nally (3) ￿rms compete
in quantities in a Cournot fashion. To capture the e⁄ect of open source under GPL, we assume
that (i) each ￿rm is free to use the open source and (ii) any innovation made by a ￿rm which
uses the open source in the ￿rst period, will be open source in the second period.
Let ki denote the production technology level for ￿rm i; in the sense that ci = 1￿ki￿ is the
unit cost of ￿rm i; where 0 < ￿ < 1
3. Let kos denote the production technology level of the open
source. Before the ￿rst period starts, the public production technology level is kos = 1, that is,
cos = 1 ￿ ￿; and there are Mk ￿rms with unit cost 1 ￿ k￿ where
P
k Mk = N and the initial
technology level k 2 f0;1g.1 Assume that the initial number of ￿rms for each technology level
k, fMkgk, is publicly known.
2.1 First Period
In the ￿rst stage, each ￿rm decides whether to use the open source or not. Let mi 2 f0;1g
denote the open source use decision for ￿rm i, where 0 stands for not use, and 1 for use. Call it
a non-user and user ￿rm, respectively. When a ￿rm is indi⁄erent between using and not using
the open source, we assume that it chooses to use it. Denote the production technology level of
￿rm i after its open source use decision with K(mi;ki). Then,
K(mi;ki) = mi max(ki;kos) + (1 ￿ mi)ki.
1In our model, no one is doing better than open source in period 1. We will discuss how our model can be
extended to more general cases later.
4In this chapter, we concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium. That is, we assume that ￿rms
under the same conditions (mi;ki) make the same decision and write ki = k when there is no
risk of confusion. Let nk denote the number of the other ￿rms that have cost 1￿k￿ on decision
after the open source use decision, excluding the ￿rm i￿ s own decision. Using boldface to denote
equilibrium number of ￿rms,
n0 = (1 ￿ m0)M0
n1 = M1 + (1 ￿ ￿)m0M0
where m0 and m1 are the open source use decisions of the ￿rms with ki = 0 and 1, respec-
tively. Let V m
k denote the ￿rst period expected value of a ￿rm with (m;k) at the end of the ￿rst
stage. Then, V 1
k ￿ V 0
k if and only if m = 1 is preferred to m = 0 for each initial k 2 f0;1g
In the second stage, knowing its own mi and the equilibrium number of the other ￿rms for
each k, fnkgk, ￿rm i with (mi;ki) invests in innovation by picking the probability of success,
p
mi
ki at cost C(p
mi
ki ) = 1
2(p
mi
ki )2. That is, the technology is advanced by one level ki + 1 with
probability p
mi
ki and it remains in the same level ki with probability 1￿p
mi
ki . The problem a ￿rm
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k is the expected future payo⁄ when an innovation is successful with (m;k) in period 1.
Similarly, Wm
k is an expected value for the future when an innovation fails with (m;k) in period
1. Let E[￿k] denote the expected pro￿t with technology level k in current period. Let Nk denote
the number of ￿rms that have cost 1 ￿ k￿ after the innovation realizations.
In the third stage, ￿rms engages in a quantity-setting game a la Cournot. Each ￿rm i decides
how much it produces qki. At that time, the ￿rm cannot observe other ￿rms￿realized technology
but has an expected number of ￿rms under a symmetric equilibrium denoted by fNkgk.2 Note
2N0 = (1 ￿ p0)n0, N1 = p
0
















1. Note that there are two
types among ￿rms with ki = 1 after use decision mi. One is originally having ki = 1 and the other is having





k Nk = N ￿ 1 since ￿rm i￿ s own is excluded. The expected inverse demand of a ￿rm
with ki is given by Pki ￿ P(Qki) = A ￿ Qki; where A > 0 is su¢ ciently large, P is the market
price, and Qki is the expected total quantity of a ￿rm with ki. The expected total quantity can
be decomposed into two parts, its own quantity, which is known, and expected all other ￿rms￿
quantities. That is, Qki = qki + Q￿i where Q￿i =
P
k Nkqk. Under Cournot competition, ￿rm
i solves the following problem
max
qki
E[￿ki] = (Pki ￿ cki)qki.
We assume that ￿rms can observe the realized number of ￿rms, fNkgk at the end of the
stage.
2.2 Second Period
Let X0 denote a variable in period 2 when the variable was denoted by X in period 1. For
instance, open source use decision in period 2 is denoted by m0
i. In the second period, the
￿rst period is essentially repeated but with an important di⁄erence. Whenever a ￿rm uses the
open source in the ￿rst period and succeeds in cost-reducing innovation, the new production
technology (the new level of unit cost) becomes free, in the second period, to adopt by any other
￿rm. Therefore, whenever there is at least one successful user ￿rm in the ￿rst period, the open
source is improved by one level, k0
os = maxi2Ifkig where I is a set of user ￿rms. This assumption
is motivated by the philosophy of the GPL, which grants the recipients of a computer program
the rights of free software de￿nition and ensures this freedom is preserved, even when the work
is changed or added to.
3 Equilibrium Analysis: Second Period
To solve this model, we study the subgame perfect equilibrium of the three stage-two period
game. Hence we solve the model backwards. But before we do so, we ￿rst prove a very useful
lemma.





1 = M1(1 ￿ m1) and n
1
1 = M1m1 + M0m0.
6Lemma 1 In period 2, m0
i = 1 is a best response for any history of the game, for all i:
The proof is straightfoward. Any ￿rm with k0
i = 0 in the beginning of period 2 will be strictly
better o⁄ using the open source since open source has a strictly lower its unit cost. Any ￿rm
with k0
i = 1 will be strictly better o⁄ if k0
os = 2 and will be indi⁄erent if k0
os = 1: Any ￿rm with
k0
i = 2 has no bene￿t from using the open source, so those ￿rms will be indi⁄erent between using
and not using the open source. Simply speaking, since there is no future in the last period,
there is no negative future e⁄ect of using the open source now. Hence all ￿rms at this stage
will be weakly better o⁄ by using the open source. This lemma allows us to build up backward
induction simply. Also note that the lemma is applicable to the ￿nal period in any ￿nite game.
3.1 Third Stage: Cournot Competition
Each ￿rm i observes own unit cost ki and has an expectation of a technology distribution in
the market, fN0
kgk.3 The expected inverse demand with ki is P0
ki ￿ P(Q0
ki) = A ￿ Q0
ki. The











k = N ￿ 1.
By Lemma 1, there is no ￿rm with k0
i = 0 after innovation realization in the second period
since k0
































By using these, we can get the expected pro￿t of a ￿rm with k0
i, E[￿0
ki] = (q0
ki)2 for each k0.
























4For details, see Appendix 3.A.
7￿rm.
3.2 Second Stage: Investment in Innovation
Similar to the third stage, when ￿rms decide their investment levels, they know their own unit
cost but only know a fraction of ￿rms with each k0 in equilibrium. Note that at this stage
k0
i 2 f1;2g, that is, k0
i = 0 will never be realized. This is because each ￿rm will ￿nd it optimal
to use the open source in the second period by Lemma 1 and k0
os = 1 at least. Recall that n0
k
means the number of ￿rms that have unit cost 1 ￿ k0￿ after the open source use decision but
before the investment decision in the second period. Each ￿rm i with unit cost 1￿k￿ invests in
probabilities of success in innovation, p0
























kb if and only if k0
a > k0
b. Thus, the above result implies that a more advanced
￿rm invests more than a less advanced ￿rm.
3.3 First Stage: Using Open Source
The ￿rst stage in period 2 is already discussed in the beginning of this section. And the result
is summarized in Lemma 1; any ￿rms prefer to use the open source in the last period.
84 Equilibrium Analysis: First Period
4.1 Third Stage: Cournot Competition
Similar to period 2, a ￿rm i with ki decides how much it will produce;
max
qki
E[￿ki] = (Pki ￿ cki)qki
A notable di⁄erence from period 2 is k 2 f0;1;2g at the third stage. The equilibrium









q1 = q0 +
￿
2
q2 = q0 + ￿
The same as the second period, the ￿rst period equilibrium pro￿t for a ￿rm with unit cost 1￿k￿
is E[￿k] = (qk)2 for each k 2 f0;1;2g.
4.2 Second Stage: Investment in Innovation
In the investment stage, there are two possible technology levels, k 2 f0;1g. Each ￿rm invests
in probabilities of success in innovation by maximizing its expected pro￿t. However this is more
involved than the maximization problem in the investment stage in the second period. Here, on
the other hand the investment decision of a ￿rm depends not only on its current unit cost but
also on its open source use decision. Hence a ￿rm with unit cost 1 ￿ k￿ and open source use
decision m chooses pm
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k are the second period expected pro￿t of a ￿rm with (m;k) in period 1 when
it has succeeded and failed in period 1, respectively.
9Similar to period 2, the optimal investment level in period 1 is given by
pm




4.3 First Stage: Using Open Source
In the very ￿rst stage, each ￿rm decides whether to use the open source or not. The decision
will be based on the initial unit cost. The main trade-o⁄ for a ￿rm which has unit cost 1 (that
is, k = 0) is that using the open source will be bene￿cial for the ￿rst period through lower unit
cost, but a potential innovation by such a ￿rm will decrease the unit cost of other ￿rms in the
second period, because of the structure imposed by the GPL. Recall that V m
k is the ￿rst period
expected value of a ￿rm with (m;k);
V m
k = pm
k [E[￿k+1] + W
m
k ] + (1 ￿ pm
k )[E[￿k] + Wm
k ] ￿ C(pm
k )
The optimal decision for a ￿rm with initial unit cost 1 ￿ ￿; that is, k = 1; is not to use the
open source. Any ￿rm with unit cost 1; that is, k = 0; will choose to use the open source. This
is summarized, respectively, in the two propositions below. But ￿rst we provide some useful
identities which we will use in the proof of the propositions, after introducing several notations.
Let W
inf
k denote the second period expected pro￿t for a ￿rm with k when the ￿rm is one of
the least advanced, that is, when there exists at least one other ￿rm with b k > k and no other
￿rms with e k < k before the second period investment decisions are made. W
sup
k is for the case
when the ￿rm is one of the most advanced, that is, there exists at least one other ￿rm with e k < k
and no other ￿rm with b k > k. Finally, W
equ
k implies the expected pro￿t when every ￿rm has k.
Now consider a case when a ￿rm fails to innovate in the ￿rst period. In such a case, the
￿rm￿ s use decision does not a⁄ect its expected second period pro￿ts. To see this, ￿rst note that
the ￿rm￿ s use decision does not improve the open source in the second period. Secondly, the
￿rm will use the open source in the second period by Lemma 1, so its expected future pro￿t
only depends on other ￿rms￿behavior. Therefore, the second period expected pro￿t of such a




1 + (1 ￿ ￿)W
inf
1 ] + (1 ￿ ￿)W
equ
2 (1)
where ￿ is the probability that every other user ￿rm fails to innovate in the ￿rst period, and
￿￿ is the probability that all other non-user ￿rms initially with k = 1 fail to innovate in the ￿rst
period.
With probability 1￿￿, at least one user ￿rm succeeds. Then, the open source will be k0
os = 2,
so every ￿rm will have k0 = 2. With probability ￿, no user ￿rm makes a success so k0
os = 1.
In such a case, either every ￿rm has k0 = 1; or there is at least one other ￿rm with k0 = 2
by Lemma 1. The former has probability ￿; and the latter has probability 1 ￿ ￿: Hence the
expression above.
Note that a non-user ￿rm with initial k = 0 can not improve the source even when it succeeds
in the ￿rst period. Hence we have the identity below.
W
0
0 = W (2)
A non-user ￿rm with initial k = 1 will have k0 = 2 if it succeeds. In this case, when none of
the user ￿rms succeed, the open source stays at k0
os = 1, so its pro￿t is W
sup
2 . Otherwise, every
￿rm will have k = 2 by Lemma 1 so its pro￿t will be W
equ
2 . Hence the ￿rm will earn W
sup
2 with
probability ￿, and W
equ





2 + (1 ￿ ￿)W
equ
2 (3)
Finally, if a user ￿rm succeeds, then the source will be k0
os = 2, so does every other ￿rm.
Therefore the ￿rm will get W
equ








Now we can prove our ￿rst result.
11Proposition 1 A ￿rm with the same technology level as the open source does not use the open
source in period 1.
Proof. See the Appendix B.
The intuition for this result is that whenever a ￿rm starts the game with the same unit
cost as the open source has, there is no direct bene￿t from using the open source. However,
using the open source makes the ￿rm obliged to share its potential ￿rst period innovation, with
other ￿rms, in the second period, who choose to use the open source in the second period. This
removes any potential cost advantage the ￿rm could have in the second period quantity setting
game. Hence any such ￿rm will avoid using the open source.
Our second result says that any ￿rm that produces the good at a higher unit cost than the
open source will choose to use the open source even though GPL makes the ￿rm obliged to share
its potential innovation in the ￿rst period with the ￿rms in the second period.
Proposition 2 A ￿rm with lower technology level than the open source chooses to use the open
source in period 1.
Proof. See the Appendix B.
The intuition for this result is as follows. For a ￿rm with a lower technology level (that is, a
higher unit cost) than the open source, it is clear that using the open source directly improves
the ￿rm￿ s production technology hence its expected pro￿t in period 1. Now compare the second
period expected pro￿t from between using and not using the open source. First consider a case
where the ￿rst period innovation fails. Then, by (1), the second period expected pro￿t is the
same between a user ￿rm and a non-user ￿rm. Now consider when the ￿rst period innovation
succeeds. The second period expected pro￿t of a user ￿rm is V
equ
2 since every other ￿rm will
share its innovation. For a non-user ￿rm, its technology level in the beginning of period 2 is
k0 = 1. Hence, the second period expected pro￿t of a non-user ￿rm is at best V
equ
2 , or possibly
V
inf
1 when all user ￿rms has failed and some non-user ￿rm with initial k = 1 make a success.
In sum, for a ￿rm with a lower initial technology than the open source, using the open source
12is bene￿cial for the second period in expectation as well as the ￿rst period. Therefore, the
incentive to use the open source dominates the incentive not to use it.
5 Discussion
In this section we discuss several relevant points and extensions. One of the most important
questions is whether the open innovation under GPL improves social welfare of the economy
and, if it does, by how much. Based on ￿rm￿ s optimal use decision, our model provides a way
to measure the welfare gain and loss from open source. The welfare gain comes from stronger
competition in the production stage than without open source case. In the innovation race, open
source helps ￿rms that are behind to keep chasing ￿rms that are ahead. On the other hand, it
increases the likelihood that advanced ￿rms are caught relative to the situation without open
source. Then, there will be larger consumer surplus under the open source than without it.
However, ￿rms have investment costs as well as production costs. A stronger competition under
the open source may lead both advanced ￿rms and lagged ￿rms invest more than the socially
optimal level. We can measure how much social welfare gain comes from the open source as
SW = SW(kos = 1) ￿ SW(kos = 0) where SW(kos) = CS(kos) + PS(kos), CS is consumer
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Another interesting question related with welfare analysis in open innovation is whether the
social welfare from GPL dominates that from traditional licenses or patent systems. Our model
allows one to quantitatively do welfare comparisons and to determine the conditions for a welfare
gain.
The initial unit cost distribution we have assumed is a speci￿c one; ki is equal to either 1 or
0. Instead, we can assume a more general distribution. When the initial k 2 f0;1;￿￿￿ ;2Mg and
kos = M, we can describe ￿rms with lower and higher technology levels than the open source
accordingly. Under this assumption, the idea behind our results will still be valid, that is, the
￿rms that have a higher unit cost than the source will use the source, the ￿rms that have the
same or lower unit cost will choose not to use the source. Then, we can extend our model to
more than two periods easily. Analyzing a longer horizon, we can understand the evolution of
the open source technology together with use decisions of the ￿rms over time.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed a simple model of innovation in cost reduction with an open source
production technology present for the ￿rms to freely use. We assumed, in the spirit of the GPL,
that whenever a user succeeds in cost reduction innovation, it has to share this new technology
with other users. Because of this aspect of the GPL, we used a dynamic model with two periods.
We characterized the optimal open source use decision of a ￿rm as a function of its technology
level relative to the open source. A ￿rm that has the same technology as the open source ￿nds
it optimal not to use the open source. A ￿rm that has a lower production technology level ￿nds
it optimal to use the source.
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7 Appendix A
7.1 Cournot Competition
Recall that the expected inverse market demand with knowing its own technology level ki is
given by Pki ￿ P(Qki) = A ￿ Qki. And Qki = qki + Q￿i where Q￿i = (N0q0 + N1q1 + N2q2)
and N0 + N1 + N2 = N ￿ 1. Under Cournot competition, ￿rm i solves the following problem
max
qki
E[￿ki] = (Pki ￿ cki)qki
From the ￿rst order condition,
@E[￿ki]
@qki




= A ￿ Qki ￿ cki ￿ qki







= 1. From the fact cki = 1 ￿ ki￿, we have the following equilibrium
condition for each ki;
2qki = A ￿ (1 ￿ ki￿) ￿ (N0q0 + N1q1 + N2q2)
It is easy to see qki+1 = q0 + ￿
2ki. Plugging each ki into the above equation, we get the










Now we calculate the equilibrium pro￿t levels. First, note that

































































￿ki = (Pki ￿ cki)qki =
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q0 + 1 ￿
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k)2; where k 2 f1;2;3g:
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Now we can calculate V 0
1 ￿ V 1
1 :
V 0
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1 + 1 > 0 because p0
2 > p0
1. Hence, ￿0







3) < 0. Therefore E[￿0
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2 < 1] > p0
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2 = 1] + (1 ￿ p0
2)E[￿0
2jn0
2 = 1] for any
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2 are strictly increasing in p0
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Rearranging terms we can write,
V 0
0 = p0
0(E[￿1] ￿ E[￿0]) + E[￿0] + (p0
0W
0
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0W
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First order conditions are
p0









18Plugging these into the expected pro￿t expressions, we get,
V 0
0 = (E[￿1] ￿ E[￿0] + W
0
0 ￿ W0
0)(E[￿1] ￿ E[￿0]) + E[￿0]












= (E[￿1] ￿ E[￿0])2 + 2(W
0
0 ￿ W0










= (E[￿1] ￿ E[￿0] + W
0
0 ￿ W0















































0)2] + E[￿1] ￿ E[￿0] by (1).
Since E[￿1] > E[￿0]; it su¢ ces to show p1
0 > p0
0: Recall that ￿k = (qk)



































































































































































2 ￿ 1 < 0 because p0
2 > p0
1. Hence, ￿0







3) < 0. Therefore E[￿0
kjn0
1 < 1] < E[￿0
kjn0




1 < 1] + (1 ￿ p0
2)E[￿0
1jn0
1 < 1] < [p0
2E[￿0
2jn0
1 = 1] + (1 ￿ p0
2)E[￿0
1jn0
1 = 1] ￿ C(p0
2)]
for any p0




1 are strictly increasing in p0







1 = 1] > E[￿0
kjn0

















1 g: Hence W
equ
2 ￿ W1




0 > V 0
0 .
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